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Narrow Channel discusses landmark cases related to the transportation industry. Contributor Atty. Joey T. Banday is vice president of the Maritime Law Association, and in-house legal counsel of the Pac-Atlantic Group of Companies.

 

You are now in: Narrow Channel Archive : 2004 Q4

 

 

*Oral Charter Party (December 27, 2004)

*Is the Bank Liable for Signing Shipper's Letter of Indemnity? (November 1, 2004)

*Can the Carrier Be Exempt from Liability Due to Fire? (October 18, 2004)

 

Oral Charter Party

SOMETIME in June 1978, Marvel Development Co. (MDC) entered into a written barging and towage contract with Mr. Gabby Yu (GY) for the shipment of the former's cargo from Iligan City to Kalibo, Aklan.

Under the said contract, MDC was allowed four lay days and it agreed to pay demurrage at the rate of P5,000 for every day of delay.

After the MV "Tanda" had passed the Mactan-Mandaue Bridge, fire ensued in her engine room, destroying the vessel and her cargoes.

Subsequently, GY sent a barge and a tugboat to Iligan City and the loading of cargoes began immediately. But upon completion of the loading, the parties agreed to divert the barge to Roxas City for a cargo consigned to Modern Hardware in that city. This new agreement was not reduced to writing.

The cargo for Modern Hardware was eventually unloaded and received by the consignee in Roxas City.

Six months later, GY demanded payment of demurrage charges in the amount of P40,000 for an alleged delay of eight days and four hours. MDC ignored the demand of GY. And the latter filed a suit.

After trial on the merits, the trial court ordered MDC to pay GY the demurrage charges with interest, attorney's fees and cost.

The Court of Appeals held that since the diversion of the cargo to Roxas City was not covered by a new written agreement, the original agreement must prevail.

In the Supreme Court, MDC contended that the first written contract was replaced by a new verbal agreement that did not contain any stipulation for demurrage.

But the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"In ruling that in the absence of a new written agreement, the old agreement must prevail, the courts a quo were saying that the first agreement continued to be valid because the second was void. That is hardly a logical conclusion.

 

The contract executed by MDC and GY was a contract of affreightment. As defined, a contract of affreightment is a contract with the shipowner to hire his ship or part of it, for the carriage of goods, and generally takes the form either of a charter party or a bill of lading.

Article 652 of the Code of Commerce provides that "a charter party must be drawn in duplicate and signed by the contracting parties" and enumerates the conditions and information to be embodied in the contract, including "the lay days and extra lay days to be allowed and the demurrage to be paid for each of them".

But while the rule clearly shows that this kind of contract must be in writing, the succeeding Article 653 just as clearly provides:

"If the cargo should be received without a charter party having been signed, the contract shall be understood as executed in accordance with what appears in the bill of lading, the sole evidence of title with regard to the cargo for determining the rights and obligations of the ship agent, of the captain and of the charterer.

We read this last provision as meaning that the charter party may be oral, in which case the terms thereof, not having been reduced to writing, shall be embodied in the bill of lading.

Let us bear in mind that a charter party may be oral and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by provisions of the bill of lading.


As the year 2004 is about to end, let us thank the Almighty for all the blessings we have received. And pray that the ensuing year be more blessed. Happy holidays to everyone!

For questions or comments, contact the writer at jtb@pac-atlantic.com.

 

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Is the Bank Liable for Signing Shipper's Letter of Indemnity?

Sometime in December 1991, Mr. Nestor Anel delivered to Long Shipping Lines a cargo to be transported on board the MV "Tanda" on her voyage from Cebu City for Surigao del Sur. The shipping company issued bill of lading no. 10 where Mr. Anel was both the shipper and consignee of the cargo valued, on the face thereof, in the amount of P6,500.00.

Mr. Anel subsequently insured the cargo covered by bill of lading no. 10 with CB Insurance Co., Inc. for the amount of P100,000.00 "against all risks" under an open policy.

After the MV "Tanda" had passed the Mactan-Mandaue Bridge, fire ensued in her engine room, destroying the vessel and her cargoes.

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Anel filed a claim with CB Insurance Co., Inc. The latter approved his claim and he signed a Subrogation Receipt after receiving the amount of P100,000.00.

Three months later, he also filed a claim with the shipping company. The shipping company paid Mr. Anel the amount of P6,500.00 in full payment of his claim without knowing that the same cargo was insured with CB Insurance Co., Inc.

Then, as subrogee of Mr. Anel, CB Insurance Co., Inc. filed a complaint against Long Shipping Lines with the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the recovery of the amount of P100,000.00 which it paid to Mr. Arnel.

But the trial court dismissed the case for lack of merit.

However, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered Long Shipping Lines to pay the amount of P100,000.00 to CB Insurance Co., Inc.

In the Supreme Court, CB Insurance Co., Inc. contested that the liability of the common carrier should be based on the actual insured value of the goods, subject of the case. On the other hand, Long Shipping Lines claimed its liability should be limited to the value declared by the shipper/consignee in the bill of lading.

The Supreme Court ruled as follows:

"The records show that the bill of lading covering the lost goods contain the stipulation that in case of claim for loss or for damage to the shipped merchandise or property, the liability of the common carrier x x x shall not exceed the value of the goods as appearing in the bill of lading.

 

In the present case, the stipulation limiting petitioner's (Long Shipping Lines) is not contrary to public policy. In fact, its just and reasonable character is evident. The shipper/consignee may recover the full value of the goods by the simple expedient of declaring the true value of the shipment in the bill of lading. Other than the payment of a higher freight, there was nothing to stop the shipper from placing the actual value of the goods therein.

A shipper/consignee that undervalues the real worth of the goods it seeks to transport does not only violate a valid contractual stipulation but commits a fraudulent act when it seeks to make the common carrier liable for more than the amount it declared in the bill of lading.


It is well to point out that, for assuming a higher risk (the alleged actual value of the goods), the insurance company was paid the correct higher premium by the shipper/consignee; while petitioner was paid a fee lower than what it was entitled to for transporting the goods that had been deliberately undervalued by the shipper in the bill of lading. Between the two of them, the insurer should bear the loss in excess of the value declared in the bill of lading. This is the just and equitable solution. "

Let us bear in mind that the liability of a common carrier is the "actual valuation declared by the shipper/consignee in the bill of lading" and not the "actual insured value" of the goods.

For questions or comments, contact the writer at jtb@pac-atlantic.com.

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Can the Carrier Be Exempt from Liability Due to Fire?

No. And this is the story.

Sometime in 1993, Beauty Plants, Inc. delivered some artificial trees to Share Company , the General Ship Agent of Dutch Lines, a foreign shipping corporation, for transportation and delivery at the port of Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.

Poly Assurance Company insured the cargo against all risks.

While the carrying vessel was in transit, she and her cargo caught fire. The vessel eventually sank.

Share Company informed Beauty Plants, Inc. about the tragedy. Consequently, Poly Assurance Company paid Beauty Plants, Inc. corresponding to the amount of the insurance for the cargo.

Then, Poly Assurance Company sent a demand letter to Share Company demanding the reimbursement of what it paid to Beauty Plants, Inc. on the basis of the Subrogation Receipt. But Share Company denied any liability on the ground that such liability was extinguished when the vessel was gutted by fire.

Thus, Poly Assurance Company filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against Share Company and Dutch Lines. After trial on the merits, trial court rendered a Decision in favor of Poly Assurance Company.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration of Share Company and Dutch Lines. And they elevated the case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court ruled in the following manner:
"Fire is not one of those enumerated under the above provision (Art. 1734, Civil Code) which exempts a carrier from liability for loss or destruction of the cargo.

In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled that since the peril of fire is not comprehended within the exceptions in Article 1734, then the common carrier shall be presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it has observed the extraordinary diligence required by law.

Even if fire were to be considered a natural disaster within the purview of Article 1734, it is required under Article 1739 of the same Code that the natural disaster must have been the proximate and only cause of the loss, and that the carrier has exercised due diligence to prevent or minimize the loss before, during or after the occurrence of the disaster."

Let us always remember that fire will not exempt the carrier from liability for loss or destruction of cargo. And in those cases where the presumption of fault or negligence is applied, the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption.

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For comments or inquiries, email the writer at jtb@pac-atlantic.com.ph.

 

You are now in: Narrow Channel Archive : 2004 Q4

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